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Error-Centricity, Habeas Corpus, and The Rule of
Law as The Law of Rulings
Roger Berkowitz*
Objektivitdt und Gerechtigkeit haben nichts miteinander zu
thun.
-Friedrich Nietzsche'
[Objectivity and justice have nothing to do with one another.]
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1927, as hundreds of thousands of protesters
marched in New York, Paris, Berlin and in cities from South America
to the Soviet Union, as workers around the world called general strikes
and took to the streets, and as, in the words of one commentator, "the
world waited,' 2 a team of attorneys representing Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti sought out United States Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Trailed byjournalists to Holmes' Beverly,
Massachusetts summer residence, the attorneys pleaded with the Justice
to grant Sacco and Vanzetti a writ of habeas corpus. If Holmes were to
grant the writ, the murder verdict against the two Italian-American
anarchists would be nullified, and they would be set free pending a new
trial. As Sacco and Vanzetti were scheduled to be executed that
evening, time was short and tensions were high.
Accused of murdering Frederick A. Parmenter, a paymaster, and
Alessandro Beradelli, his guard, during the payroll robbery of the Slater
and Morrill shoe factory on April 15, 1920, Sacco and Vanzetti had
been convicted by a unanimous trial jury on July 14, 1921. They
appealed the decision, arguing both that they were innocent and that
they had been denied constitutional and statutory procedures necessary
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to guarantee a fair trial.3 Massachusetts law at the time stipulated that
the only judge to rule on the merits of the appeal could be the trial
judge,4 Webster Thayer, who himself stood accused of prejudice and
partisanship against the defendants. It was only after Judge Thayer had
refused all of the appeals and had sentenced Sacco and Vanzetti to
"suffer the punishment of death by the passage of a current of electricity
through [their] bod[ies]...", and after the mercy of executive clemency
had been denied by the governor, that the lawyers-with the execution
of Sacco and Vanzetti looming-took the then extraordinary step of
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Habeas Corpus-literally translated: have the body present-was,
and technically remains, a civil-as opposed to a criminal-law
procedure available to prisoners held without legal authority.5 Habeas
corpus cum causum and its successor writ, habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum were originally writs designed to compel the appearance
of a defendant in court. They were employed by English justices in the
17th century to freeprisoners held by the King or his representatives
without legal cause. The breadth of the writ extended to many kinds
of improper confinements. It provided wives relief from illegal
detention by their husbands,7 it gave persons committed to asylums the
right to secure a medical review showing cause for confinement,' and
it enabled slaves brouht into English territory to escape being sent back
to slavery in the U.S. The writ of habeas corpus, Alexander Hamilton
wrote in Federalist 83, was, along with trial by jury, the necessary and
sufficient bulwark against "arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended
offenses, and arbitrary punishment upon arbitrary convictions."1
3. Of primary importance were the allegations, supported by affidavits, that
the prosecution had knowingly encouraged peijury by one of the ballistics experts
testifying against Sacco and Vanzetti, that certain members of the jury and the
judge himselfhad expressed highly prejudicial opinions about Sacco and Vanzetti's
personal and political beliefs, and that new evidence in the form of a confession to
the murder by another man could exonerate Sacco and Vanzetti. In all, eight
motions were filed. Commonwealth vs. Sacco and Vanzetti (Robert P. Weeks ed.,
1958).
4. While the Massachusetts Court of Appeals could evaluate the trial judge's
findings of law, it was forbidden from reviewing his application of the law to the
facts of the case. See Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (Academic
Reprints 1954) (1927).
5. Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 2.2 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Practice].
6. William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 12-95
(Greenwood Press 1980). See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History
169 (1990).
7. Streater's Case (1653).
8. R.V. Turlington, exparte D'Vebre (1761).
9. Ex parte Somerset (1772).
10. The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Hailed as the "[g]reat and efficacious writ," habeas corpus has
long been considered one of the treasured inheritances of the English
struggle for individual liberty and the rule of law. It has been
"'esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal
liberty;""' no lesser authority on English law than William
Blackstone has hailed habeas corpus as "another Magna Carta,"' 2 and
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed that "[i]t is not the
boasting of empty rhetoric that has treated the writ of habeas corpus
as the basic safeguard of freedom in the Anglo-American world."' 3
The writ was considered so fundamental a protection of personal
liberty that the founding fathers guaranteed its availability in the
United States Constitution. 4 In 1867, more than fifty years before
Sacco and Vanzetti sought to save their lives with a writ of habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court gushed that habeas corpus was a remedy
"for every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the
National Constitution, treaties or laws. It is impossible,"- Chief
Justice Chase continued, "to widen this jurisdiction."'" The idea,
therefore, that a writ of habeas corpus could be used to prevent the
happening of a grave injustice was in itself neither out of the ordinary
nor new.
While habeas corpus had long been a bulwark protecting
individual liberty, Sacco and Vanzetti's claim that their convictions
were injustices remediable by habeas corpus was at the time radical.
In spite of its reputation, the writ did not inquire into the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner, 6 but only into whether the detaining
authority had the proper legal jurisdiction to adjudicate the proffered
cause. 17 Habeas corpus was not, until the latter half of the 2 0 th
century, a legitimate means of addressing factual or procedural trial
error in state courts.' 8 Even if, as has been argued recently, the scope
11. See George Burton Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution, at 76-
77 (cited in Duker, 1980, at 7).
12. William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Law of England 136 (1770)
(cited in Duker, supra note 6, at 7).
13. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512, 73 S. Ct. 437,449 (1953) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
14. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
15. Ex parte Mccardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 318, 326 (1867).
16. "At common law a petitioner was not permitted to introduce evidence to
controvert the truth of a return filed in response to a writ of habeas corpus ." Dallin
H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus 453 (1966) (citing,
Commonwealth v. Chandler, 11 Mass. 83 (1814)).
17. This mainstream opinion is most forcefully advocated by Paul Bator. Paul
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963). For an opposing viewpoint, see Habeas Corpus
Practice, supra note 5, §2.
18. The modem and specifically American use of the writ to remedy trial errors
emerged sporadically as a minority doctrine in U.S. federal courts in the late 19th
2004] 479
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of review in habeas corpus cases expanded in the early 2 0 th century to
include errors of law as well as mixed legal and factual errors, 9 the
fact remained that the writ could neither open an inquiry into the
petitioners' innocence,20 nor could it grant post-conviction relief as a
result of mere errors of law. "It is certainly true," Holmes wrote in
Moore v. Dempsey, "that mere mistakes of law in the course of a trial
are not to be corrected [by habeas corpus].",2' Legal error alone,
absent some further circumstance voiding the trial court's jurisdiction,
was not enough to justify issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
While it has been suggested that the Court's emphasis on
jurisdiction as the main inquiry in habeas corpus cases has been
perfunctory,2 2 the Court continued to insist that valid claims for a writ
of habeas corpus challenge thejurisdiction of the trial court. In Matter
ofMoran, for example, Justice Holmes held for the Court that a claim
of error regarding the forcing of a defendant to incriminate himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment could not be recognized under the
writ of habeas corpus, because "it did not go to the jurisdiction of the
court., 23 Even in Moore v. Dempsey, where the Court granted a writ
to Afican-Americans whose trial jury had been intimidated by a mob,
Holmes reaffirmed the traditional view that mistakes of law could
only give rise to a claim of habeas corpus "if the case is that the whole
proceeding is a mask-that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the
fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State
Courts failed to correct the wrong.
2 1
and early 20th centuries. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (granting a
writ of habeas corpus where a federal prisoner was convicted according to an
unconstitutional statute); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 435 S. Ct. 265 (1923)
(When the state appellate and corrective procedures are radically insufficient to
prevent the potentiality of error, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted.). See
generally Duker, supra note 6, at 241-57; Oaks, supra note 16; Bator, supra note
17, at 478-93; H.L.A. Hart, Foreword, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959); Jordan Steiker,
Restructuring Post-Conviction Review ofFederal Constitutional Claims Raised by
State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism 1988 U.
Chi. Leg. F. 315, 319 (Federal habeas corpus was not available for state prisoners
until the 1950s and 1960s). But see, Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 5, at 23
(arguing that "for centuries the writ [of habeas corpus] has served the same
essential function. . ").
19. Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 5, § 2.4(d), at 64-65 (arguing that
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Frank and majority opinion in Moore turned on the
question of "whether independent federal appellate review reached mixed factual
and legal determinations or only purely legal ones."
20. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88, 43 S. Ct. 265, 265
(1923).
21. Id. at 91, 43 S. Ct. at 266. See also Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 334-
35, 35 S. Ct. 582, 590 (1914).
22. Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 5, § 2.4(d), at 65-66.
23. Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96, 105, 27 S. Ct. 25, 27 (1906).
24. Moore, 261 U.S. at 91, 43 S. Ct. at 266 (1923).
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In short, habeas corpus could only free a prisoner convicted in a
U.S. court when that court was so infected with non-legal norms as
to forfeit its presumptive jurisdiction.25 Particular legal errors that
denied a defendant important constitutional protections were, taken
alone, insufficient to allow the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.
Only when both the errors at trial were so extreme as to render the
legality of the proceeding a sham, and when the corrective
procedures-as distinct from the results-were deemed so
insufficient, could a court be obliged to grant a writ of habeas corpus
in order to avoid a violation of the due process clause.
In the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, Justice Holmes, consistent with
legal dogmatics of the age,26 could not readily grant Sacco and
Vanzetti writs of habeas corpus. The procedural errors the prisoners
alleged were serious violations of their constitutional rights, and
certainly threw the fairness of the convictions into doubt; the errors,
however, did not throw the entire legality of the proceedings into
question. Sacco and Vanzetti could not rightly claim that their trial
was void, a mere empty form without legal substance.27 Holmes
refused to issue the writ, and Sacco and Vanzetti were executed.28
In his private letters, Holmes makes it clear that he had doubts
about their guilt, even writing that "my prejudices are against the
conviction."" Nevertheless, he took a kind of joy in defending his
decision. Holmes saw himself as heroic for accepting the necessary
fact that the law involves violence and even injustice. Holmes'
favorite judicial maxim is that law has little to do with justice: "'I
hate justice,"' Holmes wrote to the famous jurist Learned Hand.
25. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 183, 202-03 (1830).
26. That mere errors would not be grounds for the writ, was, with some
exceptions, still the law as late as 1949. Bator, supra note 17, at 464. In Schectman
v. Foster, e.g., Judge Learned Hand held that the writ of habeas corpus could not
be used to review or correct valid state verdicts. "It must be remembered," Hand
wrote:
that upon habeas corpus a federal court does not in any sense review the
decision in the state courts. Here, for example, the District Court could
not properly have issued the writ, no matter how erroneous the judge had
thought the state judge's conclusion that the evidence did not make out a
prima facie case of the deliberate use of perjured testimony .... [D]ue
process of law does not mean infallible process of law. If the state courts
have honestly applied the pertinent doctrines to the best of their ability,
they have accorded to an accused his constitutional rights.
172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949).
27. Memorandum ofMr. Justice Holmes, Aug. 10, 1927 (cited in R. P. Weeks,
Commonwealth vs. Sacco and Vanzetti 239 (1961)). See also, Holmes' letter to
Laski, Aug. 18, 1927, in Holmes-Laski Letters (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1953).
28. The execution was delayed for technical reasons until August 23rd.
29. Holmes' letter to Laski, August 24, 1927, in Holmes-Laski Letters, supra
note 26.
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"'[Justice] is not myjob. Myjob is to play the game according to the
rules."' 3 Since Sacco and Vanzetti had been tried and convicted
according to legal rules, Holmes did not see that the possible
execution of innocent persons represented an injustice for which
habeas corpus might be a remedy.
Habeas corpus jurisprudence changed radically in the latter half
of the 2 0th century.3' The writ is now accepted as a method for
prisoners, convicted in state court trials and whose convictions have
been upheld on appellate review, to have federal courts review the
state court proceedings looking for federal constitutional error.
While this modem application of habeas corpus as an omnipotent
writ of error32 has remained controversial, and even though the
Supreme Court and Congress have restricted its reach, the general
principle is firmly established that the writ of habeas corpus is
available to inquire into and to prevent legal errors.33
That habeas corpus, the "Great Writ" and protector of individual
liberty, should be transformed into an all-purpose writ empowered to
prevent legal errors appears, at first sight, unremarkable. What could
be more natural than the connection between the prevention of
erroneous criminal law verdicts and our sense ofjustice? Is it not, in
other words, a matter of principle that people have a profound right
not to be erroneously convicted and punished for crimes?34
And yet, habeas corpus has not lived up to its promise as a sword
ofjustice. This article argues that the evolution of habeas corpus into
a super writ of error has, against expectations, helped to reinforce the
already widening divorce of law from justice. It begins in Part II
with the historical observation that errors in criminal law verdicts
30. Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, in The Legacy of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 183 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992) (citing Harry
Schriver, What Gusto. Stories and Anecdotes About Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes 10). For a more sustained look at Holmes' philosophy, see Roger
Berkowitz, The Judge as Captain, in Europiische und Amerikanische Richterbilder
(Andr6 Gouron et al. ed., 1996).
31. But see Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 6, at 67(arguing that there has
been "no revolution" in habeas corpus jurisprudence).
32. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977).
33. The Court has reaffirmed its adherence to the "principle that federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution ...." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860
(1993). See generally Bator, supra note 17; Steiker, supra note 18, at 325; Bruce
Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 28 Review of Law &
Social Change 415 (1990); Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System (R. H. Fallon et. al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Hart and Wechsler];
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 32; Hart, supra note 18.
34. For a provocative defense of this fundamental principle, see Ronald
Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A Matter of Principle (1985).
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only recently emerged as a topic of legal concern. The advent of
habeas corpus as a writ to protect against legal error, therefore,
reflects the emergence of legal error itself as a problem. This is not
to say that criminal law has not long been preoccupied with the truth
of verdicts. On the contrary, the connection between truth and justice
has been a formative power on the development of western legal
systems. Rather, what the historical investigation makes visible is
that legal truth was not always understood as the absence of legal
error from verdicts.
Part II probes the connection between justice and the uniquely
modem obsession with legal error. Since habeas corpus has emerged
as an extraordinary means to secure justice by correcting errors, the
doctrinal debates around habeas corpus offer insight into how law
understands both error and injustice. Error is revealed by the
contemporary debates over habeas corpus, to be understood either as
the inaccuracy of substantive errors relating to a defendant's guilt or
as the unfairness emerging from constitutional errors that infect the
procedural determination of guilt. Whether error is understood as
inaccuracy or unfairness, the exploration of habeas corpus doctrines
shows that the prevention and correction of errors becomes an
essential demand of justice.
And yet, as Part IV shows, even as the avoidance of unjust error
has come to be a primary concern of habeas corpus doctrine and the
legal system as a whole, the Congress and the Supreme Court have
worked to mitigate the importance of legal errors. In the last quarter
of the 20th century-and especially with the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996-the Court
has shown an increasing willingness to turn a blind eye to claims of
both substantive and procedural errors. Modem debates around
habeas corpus, therefore, reveal an apparently paradoxical state of
affairs in which law is at once obsessed with procedures designed to
prevent error and increasingly willing to ignore error as harmless or
irrelevant.
To make sense of the Court's apparently contradictory stance
toward error requires seeing that the identification of error with
injustice has little connection to justice as jurists have traditionally
understood it. As is shown in Part V, modem jurisprudence, in
seeking justice and truth through the obsessive avoidance of legal
error, betrays a commitment to the fairness and legitimacy of verdicts
rather than to their justice or truth. When legitimacy replaces justice
as the highest goal of law, law comes to be about the law of rules.
The inquiry into habeas corpus in this paper makes manifest a
more general transformation in the nature of justice itself. Habeas
corpus exists on the border between two contradictory understandings
of justice. On the one hand, habeas corpus has a near mythical
2004] 483
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connection to justice qua justice: namely, the demand for absolute
justice above and beyond legal rules. It is this symbolic resonance
that has allowed the evolution of habeas corpus into an extraordinary
legal device that privileges an uncompromising concern for justice.
By re-visiting cases after they have been decided, habeas corpus
makes possible the righting of wrongs that have been committed in
the name of the law.
On the other hand, however, habeas corpus also seeks justice in
the sense of legitimacy. In this sense, habeas corpus does not commit
itself to justice beyond rules, but, instead, redoubles the efforts of the
legal system to ensure that the rules are fairly and objectively
applied. In subjugating justice to legitimacy, habeas corpus
jurisprudence threatens to undo justice even as it seeks to do justice.
While legitimacy and legality are often confused with justice, this
article argues that as the law increasingly strives for legitimacy it
fails to do justice. Once judges forsake the possibility of truth (either
objective or otherwise), the need to eradicate error comes to be about
the securing of legitimacy and not the pursuit of truth. What matters
is not the avoidance of errors (which is impossible) but the perception
of fairness. Modem jurisprudence, in other words, shows itself to
care about error not as error but as a threat to its legitimate authority.
The unintended consequence of privileging legitimacy over justice,
however, is that errors, as in pre-modem legal systems, again retreat
into the background of legal consideration. Whereas ancient and
medieval law accepted errors in the name of a higher truth, modem
law makes peace with error in order to enhance the legitimacy on
which its power rests. In showing how the Court privileges power
over truth in habeas corpus jurisprudence, this paper shows how the
great writ of habeas corpus is in danger of losing its once mythical
connection to justice.
II. ERROR AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
The criminal justice system is today organized around the
principle of eliminating, or at least reducing, the possibility of legal
errors. To that end, criminal verdicts are now subject to extensive
appellate procedures. Cognizant, however, of the possibility that
despite appellate review errors may go uncorrected, the Supreme
Court has adopted, through a strategic expansion of the writ of habeas
corpus, a policy of redundancy designed to safeguard against the
erroneous denial of constitutional rights. Robert Cover and
Alexander Aleinikoff, for example, have argued that the goal of the
Court's habeas corpus decisions in the 1960s was to use the
redundancy of multiple considerations of a difficult case to reduce
the possibility of error. Since "[r]edundancy fosters greater certainty
[Vol. 64
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that constitutional rights will not be erroneously denied,"35 the goal of
habeas corpus criminal procedure, as it has been expressed since
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Brown v. Allen,36 was to increase the
certainty of criminal verdicts and to ?rotect against the possibility of
constitutional and procedural errors. The principle of this distinctly
American use of habeas corpus is that all defendants have the right to
the "fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review" to ensure
that their rights of personal liberty are not erroneously denied.38
The correction and prevention of error need not be the most
important, or even a pertinent principle of a system of crime and
punishment. Utilitarian theories of criminal deterrence, for example,
exhibit little concern for the protection of the innocent. The utilitarian
goal of deterrence is served as long as the citizenry believes that those
who commit crimes will be punished; 39 whether that belief is erroneous
is of little concern to utilitarian criminal procedure. Similarly,
psychological models of criminal sacrifice are ambivalent as to the
question of the guilt of the punished. What is important is that the
community joins together to assert itself as a unity against the accused
who becomes a sacrificial offering to the community's continued
existence.4"
A lack of concern with error is also historically characteristic of
western criminal legal systems. Throughout western legal history, for
example, there has been a strong disinclination to recognize the
possibility of error in criminal judgments. Even as writs of errors in
England and appellate procedures on the Continent arose as a forum
for the remedying of legal errors in civil law proceedings, criminal law
developed no procedural remedies for erroneous decisions.4' Anglo-
American common law did not even recognize the possibility of an
appeal of criminal jury verdicts. "For centuries," Plucknett reports, "it
was an unwritten axiom that a criminal trial could not be reviewed.
The solemnity ofjury trial was so great that it was hardly thinkable that
a verdict could be set aside for any reason... "42 The judgment of a
35. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 1045.
36. 344 U.S. 443, 73 S. Ct. 397 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
37. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 1042.
38. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424, 83 S. Ct. 822, 841 (1963).
39. See, e.g. Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation (1876).
40. See, e.g., Ren6 Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1979).
41. Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
190-191 (1936). The word "appeal" originally referred to specific types of civil
appeals in cases of equity. Lawrence Meir Friedman, Crime and Punishment in
American History 256 (1993). In connection to the ius commune, see S.
Lbwenstein, Beriifung, in Handwirterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft 640 (1926).
42. The criminal appeal in England was first instituted by statute in 1907.
Plucknett, supra note 41, at 191. Prior to the statute the prosecutor could, in rare
cases, reopen the case himself by a writ of error. Such incidences were extremely
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jury and its acceptance by a judge were final, a statement of the truth
of the matter that could not be legally contested.43
Not only in England but also in Europe a strong opposition to the
appeal, and with it to the reviewing of criminal judgments, persisted
until the present century. 4 In Germany, for example, the appeal was
not mentioned in the Criminal Court Ordinances of Karl V (1532), and
post-verdict challenges were declared impermissible by the Saxon
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1530.41 Criminal appeals were first
instituted in 1877, and even then only for minor cases.46
The finality and near incontestability of criminal verdicts were also
established in the American colonies and then in the United States.
While the right of appeal in private law was well established, criminal
law appeals were, especially in serious cases, severely limited.47
Similarly, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the first congressional
Judiciary Act provided for appeals of either state or federal criminal
verdicts. Persons adjudged in federal courts of the United States had
no opportunity for appeal until the late 19th century.4 That criminal
verdicts were final, incontestable on grounds of factual or legal error,
was a commonplace for Chief Justice Marshall in 1830. "A
judgment," wrote the Chief Justice in ex parte Watkins, in its nature,
concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and pronounces the law
of the case .... It puts an end to inquiry concerning the facts by
deciding it . . . . An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be
unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a
nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it
should be erroneous.49
technical and rare.
43. See Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and
Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law and Knowledge chp. 4 (1994)
[hereinafter Law of the Other]. See also Marianne Constable, The Modern
American Jury: Fact and Law in Law and Society, 15 J. Am. Cult. 37 (1992);
Barbara Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause (1991).
44. L6wenstein, supra note 41, at 640.
45. Id.
46. D.J.G. zu Dohna, Berufung in Strafsachen 3 (1911). In the criminal
procedure codes ofNovember 1, 1877, criminal procedures were divided into three
classes, only the lowest of which were subject to appeals. See also L6wenstein,
supra note 41, at 640.
47. The laws of the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 1648, for example, allow for
the appeal by "every man cast, condemned, or sentenced in any Inferiour Court,"
except that when his cause be of a capital nature "wee admit no appeal unles where
two of five or three of six or seven, or such a proportion of the number of
Magistrates or other ludges then present shall actually dissent." General Laws and
Liberties of 1648, Massachusetts Bay Colony, Boston, 1648, at 2.
48. See Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 42 (1822); see generally Hart and
Wechsler, supra note 33.
49. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-03 (1830).
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Marshall does not say that imprisonment under ajudgment cannot
be erroneous. That to err is human was readily acknowledged by the
samejudges who maintained that a decision pronounced the "law" of
the case and that ajudgment, by its nature, is lawful. What Marshall's
wording helps to reveal is that for jurists trained in the common law
tradition, substantive and procedural errors did not challenge the truth
of a verdict.
One question raised by the English, European, and American
legal systems' lack of procedures to protect against errors in criminal
cases is, "how did these pre-modem legal systems understand the
truth of legal verdicts?" The answer is not to be found in nineteenth
and twentieth century legal restatements of the prohibition against
criminal appeals, a rule that had long since been separated from its
cultural roots. Justice Marshall, for example, provides no convincing
justification for his ruling that error is consistent with the criminal
jury verdict. Instead, he simply cites the common law rule without
attempting to justify it. Various later efforts to justify the rule against
appeals fall back onto arguments of efficiency, the fear that convicted
persons with nothing to lose will tie up judicial resources in endless
proceedings.5" Criticisms against criminal appeals include the fear of
weakening the faith in criminal verdicts,"1 and the need to finalize the
verdict quickly so that the criminal can adequately repent.52 These
arguments appear as post facto justifications for a problematic and
not fully comprehensible precedent, what Justice Felix Frankfurter
50. Paul Bator, for example, recognizes the modem difficulty of defending
efficiency and finality in criminal law, even as he embarks on an effort to do so.
Bator, supra note 17, at 442-43. See also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chic. L. Rev. 142,
143 (1970).
51. A principle argument against appeals, and similarly against the modem use
of habeas corpus, is that there is no reason to distinguish the decisions of one judge
or court as better than those of another. There is no more pointed statement of this
position than Justice Jackson's remark in Brown:
[R]eversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done.
There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial
proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540, 73 S. Ct. 397, 427 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Jackson's suspicions had a long history, beginning with the opposition
to the introduction of crininal appeals in the early part of this century. In Germany,
for example, Alexander Grafzu Dohna argued vociferously against the introduction
of criminal appeals, primarily because the appellate procedure would in no way
guarantee better decisions, and would simultaneously weaken the connection
between the people and their courts. zu Dohna, supra note 46, at 4, 5 ff.
52. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 50, at 146 (1970); L6wenstein, supra note
41, at 640.
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called a "jejune abstraction."" By the nineteenth century, the
original grounds for the rule against criminal appeals and the non-
problematic position of legal error had fallen out of memory.
In order to understand the significance of the modem need to
eliminate errors, it is first helpful to understand the pre-modem world
that saw no contradiction between error and a true saying of law. The
touchstone of medieval criminal procedure was the judgment by
means of ordeal. In trial by ordeal or by battle, judgment was
rendered by God, and the truth of the verdict was manifest in God's
decision. While the verdict was considered to be true, it was a truth
that could not be held accountable to objective determinations.
God's judgment was true despite, or rather because of, its
inscrutability and its non-objectivity. Law, the saying of a higher
truth, was not measured in human terms.5 4
Even after the religious presuppositions supporting the ordeal
disappeared, English criminal procedure retained the belief in the
truthfulness, inscrutability, and thus the finality of criminal jury
verdicts." A jury verdict (vrie-dire in law French) was a saying of
the truth of the matter.16 A jury verdict did not distinguish between
fact and law, and did not seek objectively certain truths; instead, it
issued judgments embedded in practices and informed by "a
knowledge of action or of what to do."" Since juries spoke the truth
in a "language used in and of the acted world" that is, "an inhabited
language, not an objective one,"5" the idea of checking verdicts or of
correcting the jury's errors was as nonsensical as it was foreign.
Medieval and early modem jurists understood law, an expression of
justice and truth, to emerge organically from out of sense of knowing,
a fitting regard for what is to be done. 9
53. Brown, 344 U.S. at 558, 73 S. Ct. at 436 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
54. John Langbein has argued that the early medieval ordeals were a
functional system of proof that relied on extra-human guarantees. See John
Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof 6 (1976). See also Sir Frederick Pollock
& William Maitland, The History of English Law 598-99 (1980).
55. See generally John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History
157-58 (2d ed. 1990) ( "Judgments in the superior courts were intended to be final;
there was no justification for appealing from the king to anyone else .... The kind
of attention now given to cases on appeal was therefore given, under the old system,
before judgment was entered.").
56. Marianne Constable, The Law ofthe Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing
Conceptions of Citizenship, Law and Knowledge 40 (1994).
57. Marianne Constable, The Modern American Jury. Fact and Law in Law
and Society, 15 J. Am. Cult. 37, 39 (1992). Shapiro, supra note 43.
58. Constable, supra note 57, at 40.
59. Distant echoes of this idea of law can still be heard in the idea of custom,
as long as custom is understood to signify what is fitting; i.e., as in a custom
tailored suit.
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In European ius commune as well, a premium was placed on the
true verdict, though no cognizance of errors in past verdicts was
permitted.6" This requirement of truth in medieval legal procedure,
however, was not necessarily governed by the need for certainty. Truth
was guaranteed through a criminal procedure almost as impervious to
objective reckoning as the verdict of God and the English jury.
According to medieval and early modem criminal procedure, guilt
could only be determined by the presence of two good witnesses to the
gravamen of the offense. This burdensome and rarely met standard
was carried over from the Roman law, but had little practical
significance.6 Since two living witnesses to a crime are rarely present,
the principal method of proof in medieval criminal procedure remained
the confession.62 Even when witnesses were present, the accused had
to confess their crimes.63 The confession, which was legally obtained
through torture, was at least partly designed to ascertain the factual
guilt of the suspect, and to that end medieval law set out strict
procedures to be followed before a suspect could be tortured.
But other ends, and different understandings of truth, contributed
as well to the creation of medieval and early modem criminal
procedure. The torture and confession requirements, as Michel
Foucault has argued, found their overarching rationale in that they
were the only way that criminal punishment "might use all its
unequivocal authority, and become a real victory over the accused, the
only way in which the truth might exert all its power, was for the
criminal to accept responsibility for his own crime and himself sign
what had been skillfully and obscurely constructed by the preliminary
investigation." The requirement of a confession before punishment
points toward an idea of justice that is not simply an objective
reckoning of accounts, but encompasses an ideology of retribution.
Justice understood as retribution requires that the accused sign his
support for his punishment, acknowledge the power and right of the
sovereign, and seek to be forgiven and re-integrated into the legal and
60. It is because judgments were considered final, as statements of the truth,
that the idea of errors could not be tolerated. Judgments would not be rendered
without certainty as to the truth of the outcome, and European monarchs continually
had to battle with judges who refused to decide cases on the grounds that the truth
was unknowable. Laurent Mayali, Recht Sprechen, in 14 Rechtshistorisches
Journal 284 (1995).
61. Langbein, supra note 54, at 7. See also M. Liepmann, Gestandnis, in
Handworterbuch der Rechtswissenschafl II 889-92 (1927).
62. Langbein writes that since the Roman-canon law requirement of two
witnesses was unworkable standing alone, confession, and with it torture, emerged
as the primary method of proof. Langbein, supra note 61, at 7. Liepmann calls
confessions the "chief means of proof of the old process." Id. at 889.
63. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1977).
64. Id. at 38.
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political community from which his wrong excluded him. Justice,
understood as an ideology of retribution, is not simply a manifestation
of right-though it is that-but also is apolitical act of constituting and
reconstituting a community.6
5
Given an understanding of truth and law that was, as the old
English jury verdict, embedded in the knowledge and practices of a
community, the idea that verdicts could be measured and found
erroneous by objective standards is fully an anachronism. Similarly,
the medieval requirement of confession sought to assure truth, though
a truth that is not a measurable object of this world, but rather, in an
important way, is the world itself. In such legal systems, the saying
of the truth of a verdict serves as the re-establishment of right, and acts
as the political event of the giving of the law. A legal judgment,juris-
dictio, is not simply an applying of legal propositions, but is a speaking
of the law of a people,6 and thus the founding of a people.
These historical examples show that truth, always a concern of
criminal procedure, has not always been understood as the absence of
error from a verdict. Trial error, as a problem or even a concept of
criminal justice, was not judicially recognized until recent times. The
advent of legal error as a problem for criminal law suggests an
accompanying transformation in the social and idealistic order of
society. Just as medieval procedures of proof developed in response
to the loss of faith in the religiously supported ordeals, so the modem
criminal procedure, with its multi-level protections against legal error,
emerged in response to a crisis of faith in the truth-speaking capacities
of jury verdicts and tortured confessions. Only once juries became
fact-finding bodies, and thus subject to verifiable error, could the truth
of jury verdicts be cast into doubt by suspicions of errors.67 And only
after circumstantial evidence and rationally guided free judicial
reasoning replaced the literal proof of the confession, could the truth
ofjudgments be challenged.68 The concern, even obsession, with error
today is unique to our modem legal culture. Legal error, as a problem
of criminal law, first emerged out of the ashes of the medieval and
early modem conception of legal truth.
I. ERROR AND JUSTICE
To explore the significance of the modem legal system's error-
centricity, it is necessary first to ask after the construction of error.
65. Foucault certainly recognized this when he wrote: "The public execution
is to be understood not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs,
even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which power is manifested." Id. at 47.
66. Philippe Nonet, Judgment, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 987 (1985).
67. Constable, supra note 57.
68. Langbein, supra note 54.
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Nowhere in American jurisprudence is the problem of error more
searchingly debated than in the doctrinal debates over habeas corpus.
The modem revolution in habeas corpus doctrine is governed by the
idea that erroneous convictions are unjust miscarriages ofjustice and
must be prevented whenever possible. Asking how habeas corpus
jurisprudence conceives of error can help to illuminate the modem
concept ofjustice.
There are two fundamental approaches to the cognizance of error
in habeas corpus proceedings. The constitutional error approach
requires courts to grant writs of habeas corpus upon any showing that
a defendant was erroneously denied a fair trial, i.e. a trial in accord
with constitutional procedural guarantees. Since the mid-1970s, an
opposing view of habeas corpus has emerged that shifts the habeas
inquiry from an exclusive concentration on the presence of error
understood as unfairness, to error understood as an inaccurate
determination of guilt. In this section I analyze the arguments
supporting these often opposing positions and argue that these
approaches represent apparently fundamentally opposed conceptions
of error as injustice.
A. The Constitutional Error Approach
The legal controversy over what types of errors will authorize a
post-conviction writ of habeas corpus began in earnest 25 years after
Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. In the landmark case of Brown
v. Allen,69 Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter achieved what he
had unsuccessfully sought as a member of Sacco and Vanzetti's legal
defense team-i.e. the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus into a
strategic remedy designed to correct erroneous and thus unjust trial
verdicts. The Brown decision granted persons convicted in a process
tainted by constitutional legal errors recourse to the writ of habeas
corpus, and thus the opportunity to petition for a new and
constitutionally fair trial.
The decision actually encompassed four similar cases, the most
important of which were Brown v. Allen and Daniels v. Allen.7"
Brown was an African-American man convicted of rape in North
Carolina and sentenced to death. He appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court and argued that the admission into testimony of a
coerced confession, in addition to the fact of racial discrimination in
the selection of the grand and petit juries, constituted legal errors that
violated his federal constitutional rights and denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The North
69. 344 U.S. 443, 73 S. Ct. 399.
70. Hart, supra note 18, at 106.
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Carolina Supreme Court denied his appeal,7' and the United States
Supreme Court then denied Brown a writ of certiorari,72 thus
finalizing the North Carolina verdict.
Having exhausted all of the accepted procedural channels to
obtain a new trial and to avoid execution, Brown filed in federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus. Both the district and the
federal appellate courts refused either to issue the writ or to hold a
hearing to further investigate Brown's factual claims.73 Brown then
brought his application for the writ to the Supreme Court. While the
narrow issue in Brown concerned the district and appellate courts'
use of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in their denying of the
habeas petition, the case broached as well the question of whether
habeas corpus ought to be available to challenge and remedy
constitutional errors in state court proceedings.
Daniels, also an African-American, was tried in the same manner
as Brown and, as did Brown, sought to appeal his conviction.
Daniels' lawyer, however, delivered the papers requesting an appeal
one day after the deadline imposed by the state.74 The North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to hear Daniels' appeal and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Daniels then filed for a writ of
habeas corpus which was denied by both the federal district and
appeals courts. If Brown's case raised the question of the availability
of habeas corpus in cases where purportedly erroneous verdicts had
been approved by appellate procedures, Daniels' case presented the
Court with the additional issue of whether the refusal, on procedural
grounds, to hear an appeal in a capital case was itself a constitutional
error.
In Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court denied Brown's and
Daniels' requests for habeas corpus; how the Court did so, however,
has been of profound and revolutionary importance. The Court did
not cite, as it had before, the old common law rule proclaiming the
finality of criminal verdicts. Rather, the Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus on the merits of Brown and Daniels' constitutional
claims. For the first time, the Court in Brown explicitly held that
federal courts are empowered to reexamine constitutional issues even
71. State v. Brown, 63 S.E.2d 99 (1951).
72. 341 U.S. 943,71 S. Ct. 1012 (1951).
73. Speller v. Allen, 192 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1951), affirming 98 F. Supp. 866
(E.D.N.C. 1951).
74. Actually, Daniels' lawyer had the papers ready on the day of filing, but
decided to hand deliver them the following day rather than putting them in a
mailbox. They were received by the court on the same day as they would have
been if they had been mailed in compliance with the procedural deadline. Hart,
supra note 18, at 107.
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after trial and full appellate review.75 Habeas corpus, according to
the Brown decision, is an appropriate remedy to correct constitutional
errors of procedure in otherwise final state trials.
While the Brown decision made habeas corpus available for the
remedy of errors, it has been a matter of continuing debate what
constitutes an error remediable through habeas corpus. The
controversy is fueled by the opinion that the judicial reasoning
behind the Brown decision is absent or at best inadequate; the Court,
commentators argue, neither spelled out what constitutes a
constitutional error, nor provided a justification for its break with
prior decisions.76 The majority opinion, written by Justice Reed,
abstains from any discussion of the justification of the expansive
interpretation of habeas corpus. And Justice Frankfurter's
concurring, yet authoritative,"' opinion reputedly limits its
arguments to statements of conclusion.78
Frankfurter's concurring and dissenting opinions reveal two
arguments justifying the use of habeas corpus to correct legal errors.
First, Frankfurter argues that the Judiciary Act of 1867 gives federal
courts the jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to any person
already under sentence of State courts in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.7 9 Few commentators or judges
take Frankfurter's bow to the 1867 Act seriously. While the Act is
invoked on occasion, the Court consistently treats its power to grant
habeas corpus as deriving from its equitable jurisdiction.80 Further,
though already in force for eighty-five years, the Act had never been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to give the federal courts the
75. Brown is considered to hold that, "habeas lies to correct any constitutional
error addressed in state-court proceedings." Bruce Friedman, A Tale of Two
Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 264 (1988). See also Hart, supra note 18, at 106.
(arguing that Brown "manifestly broke new ground" in finding that the due process
of law "relates essentially to the avoidance in the end of any underlying
constitutional error-that is, to the correct application of basic federal rules
governing the decision to be made).
76. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 17, at 501-03; Hart, supra note 18.
77. The confused grounds for the holding were furthered by the fact that there
were two majority opinions in the case, one by Justice Reed, and the other by
Justice Frankfurter. Frankfurter's concurring, but also partially controlling, opinion
and his separate dissent regarding the merits of the allegations of constitutional
errors, have become the accepted Court opinions in the case. As a result, any
attempt to understand how Brown and its subsequent extension have helped ot
determine what kind of errors are subject to post-conviction collateral habeas
corpus review must begin with his opinion. See generally Hart and Wechsler,
supra note 33.
78. Bator, supra note 17, at 500-01.
79. Brown, 344 U.S. at 499, 73 S. Ct. at 442.
80. Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas Corpus, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
303 (1993).
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sweeping habeas powers that Frankfurter claims, and he offers no
arguments in support of his interpretation.8 '
Second, and more importantly, Frankfurter argues that the
expanded habeas review is necessary to ensure that the few
"meritorious claims [for habeas corpus]. . . not be stifled by
undiscriminating generalities. 82 It is clear that by "undiscriminating
generalities" Frankfurter means the common law rule, that "jejune
abstraction," 3 that has prevented the granting of habeas corpus to
prisoners already convicted in state courts. Within his concurring
opinion, Frankfurter does little, however, to elaborate on what he
means by "meritorious claims" of error. Meritorious claims, he
writes, concern "rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution," for
which, in those rare cases, "habeas corpus is the ultimate and only
relief ... ."" He does, as well, provide examples of what he
considers to be meritorious claims. In such cases, for instance, when
a prisoner is convicted without the benefit of counsel, habeas corpus
must be available to correct errors.85 Also in circumstances when a
prisoner claims that his confession was coerced and improperly
admitted into evidence, when the jury selection was racially biased,
and when xerjured testimony has been knowingly used by the
prosecutor, the right of habeas corpus must be available to enforce
the equal application of constitutional procedures.
The crux of the habeas inquiry is, therefore, procedural fairness.
In Frankfurter's words, "[t]he State court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
right. 8 1 When prisoners raise questions of procedural constitutional
error, the importance of avoiding errors requires the extra scrutiny
afforded by federal habeas review.
That procedural errors are intimately connected to questions of
justice is made clear by Frankfurter's endorsement of Judge Learned
Hand's conclusion that habeas corpus is necessary to "'prevent a
complete miscarriage of justice. '  The focus of the "miscarriage
of justice" inquiry is, as it was for Hand,89 procedural-and more
specifically constitutional-error. Nowhere in his opinion does
81. Bator, supra note 17, at 500-01.
82. Brown, 344 U.S. at 498, 73 S. Ct. at 442.
83. Id. at 558, 73 S. Ct. at 436.
84. Id. at 498, 501, 73 S. Ct. at 442-43..
85. Id. at 507-08, 73 S. Ct. at 446-47.
86. Id. at 449, 73 S. Ct. at 436 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 508, 73 S. Ct. at 447.
88. Id. at 558, 73 S. Ct. at 436 (citing Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813
(2nd Cir. 1946)).
89. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2nd Cir. 1946).
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Frankfurter discuss the question of the defendants' innocence;
erroneous conclusions of guilt were, as they had been throughout the
history of habeas corpus, irrelevant to the decision of whether to
grant the writ. It is the unfairness associated from errors of
procedure that is considered to be an injustice.
What the relation between procedural errors and injustice is,
however, remains unclear. Though Frankfurter goes on to speak
colorfully regarding the "uniqueness of habeas corpus in the
procedural armory of our law," its central importance in preserving
the personal freedom that comprises the "moral health of our kind
of society," and its necessary place as a legal remedy that exists
outside rigid rules that would "give spuriously concrete form to
wide-ranging purposes or betray the purposes by strangulating
rigidities,"90 he fails to justify the use of habeas corpus to protect
against specifically procedural and constitutional errors. While the
connection between injustice, unfairness, and error is apparent to
many, Frankfurter never clearly articulates the reason why
unfairness manifested in procedural errors is to be specifically
equated with injustice.
Partially in response to the breadth of the Brown decision and the
purported lack ofjustification for the expanded use of habeas corpus
it endorsed, American jurists have sought the cause of these
doctrinal changes in the crisis occasioned by the racial situation in
the Unitied States. They have constructed a persuasive argument
tracing the emergence of habeas corpus as a legal device to the need
to check and correct legal errors associated with persistent racial
discrimination in (predominantly southern) state criminal trials.
According to this argument, Brown v. Allen 's expansion of habeas
corpus was part of a long history, beginning with the post-civil war
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and culminating in the Warren Court's
habeas corpus jurisprudence; for the Warren Court, the writ
gradually developed into a strategic weapon, the primary purpose of
which was to protect (often minority) criminal defendants from
"errors and deficiencies in the criminal process."'
Aside from this strategic and socio-historical explanation for the
constitutional error standard, jurists have also sought to explain the
development of the habeas corpus jurisprudentially, as a
consequence of procedural ideas of justice. At least two grounds
have been advanced for the conviction that important procedural
errors in state proceedings occur and, when left uncorrected, result
in injustices. Procedural errors are to be avoided first because they
reduce the reliability of the substantive outcome. People have a
90. Brown, 344 U.S. at 512, 513, 73 S. Ct. at 449.
91. Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 1087.
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right, it is thought, to criminal procedures that are strict enough that
they "attach the correct importance to the risk of moral harm"
represented by convicting the innocent.92
But procedural errors are also in themselves thought to be
substantively unfair. Regardless of the innocence or guilt of a
defendant, justice requires that an accused person be tried according
to set procedures strict enough to place a proper value on his dignity
and on his rights to be heard from before society officially decides
upon his guilt or innocence.93 The correction of errors, verdict
fairness, and equal treatment do not reflect merely utilitarian
concerns with accuracy, but are themselves substantive principles
that underlie the constitutional error standard. It is for this reason
that habeas corpus is available for any procedural error that may have
influenced the outcome of the trial, regardless of whether it in any
way concerned the innocence or guilt of the defendant.94
Frankfurter's rationale for the expansion of habeas corpus and the
association of legal errors with miscarriages of justice remains
unclear. Through his defense of Sacco and Vanzetti and other
political prisoners, he surely was personally aware of the biases and
inequalities of the American criminal justice system.95 Similarly, his
92. Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A Matter ofPrinciple 89
(1985). See also Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143, 1148 (1980) (arguing that
"the same result for person that gives form to the retributivist substantive limitation
on punishment also engenders a super due process procedural limitation").
93. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 92, at 101-03.
94. Only such a rationale seems to explain the Court's decision in Chapman
v. U.S., that even errors of procedure which are irrelevant to the defendant's guilt
or innocence are grounds for habeas corpus, as long as those errors "affect
substantial rights' of a party." See Chapman v. U.S., 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S. Ct. 824,
828 (1967).
95. Throughout his life, Frankfurter was aware of the potential for racially and
politically motivated miscarriages ofjustice. As he said to an interviewer in 1960:
The Sacco-Vanzetti affair has almost every important, really sizable issue
that cuts deeply into the feelings and judgments and conduct of the
community, implicates factors that transcend the immediate individuals
who, in the main, are instruments of forces that affect many, many beyond
the immediate actors in the affair. It involves problems that still gnaw at
my curiosity. Few questions bother me more from time to time than what
is it that makes people cowardly, makes people timid and afraid to say
publicly what they say privately .... There are a thousand and one
considerations beyond the immediate enslavement of economic
dependence which I know make people hesitant, timid, cowardly, with the
result however that those who have no scruples, who are ruthless, who
don't give a damn, influence gradually wider and wider circles, and you
get Hitler movements in Germany, Huey Long ascendency in Louisiana,
McCarthyism cowing most of the Senators of the United States at least to
the extent that they didn't speak out, etcetera, etcetera .... So the affair
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impassioned defense of Sacco and Vanzetti convinced him that,
"[g]rave injustices, as a matter of fact, do arise even under the most
civilized systems of law and despite adherence to the forms of
procedure intended to safeguard against them." He clearly believed
fair and equal procedures were necessary in order to prevent the
conviction of innocent persons, and that the "capacity to correct
errors of inevitable frailty is the mark of a civilized legal
mechanism."'96 Finally, Frankfurter's choice of habeas corpus-a
remedy designed to protect against procedural injustices-as a means
to correct legal errors, combined with his silence throughout the
Brown opinion regarding the innocence or guilt of the accused, lends
credence as well to the view that he saw procedural errors themselves
as miscarriages of justice.97
Whichever of these grounds gird the Brown decision, it has been
read by the Court, at least until the early 1970s, to hold serious
procedural errors to be miscarriages of justice, regardless of their
relation to the defendant's innocence or guilt. The zenith of the
Court's identification of justice with the avoidance of procedural
error came in the 1963 decision of Fay v. Noia.9" As in Daniels, Fay
concerned the refusal of the state courts to hear an appeal, on the
grounds that the appeal was untimely. The issue of the availability
of habeas corpus to correct procedural errors was even more starkly
presented than in Daniels, as the state conceded that Fay's trial had
violated constitutionally mandated procedures.99 The issue for the
Court, therefore, was whether the fact of procedural error was an
injustice remediable by a writ of habeas corpus.
In granting Fay a writ of habeas corpus, the Court held that
habeas corpus is an original civil remedy brought by a citizen for "the
enforcement of the right to personal liberty, rather than as a stage of
the state criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom . . . 0"
like Sacco-Vanzetti for me was a manifestation of what one might call the
human situation.
Phillips, supra note 2,at 205-206.
96. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 108.
97. Frankfurter's expressions of indignance over the procedural errors in his
book over the Sacco and Vanzetti proceedings supports this understanding as well.
Id.
98. 372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822 (1963).
99. Fay was a co-defendant in a trial. After both defendants were convicted and
sentenced to prison, Fay declined to appeal, fearing that on appeal his prison term
could be extended to a capital sentence. Fay's co-defendant did appeal, and was
successful. Fay's imprisonment was, therefore, the consequence of a trial that had
already been declared unconstitutional. When he tried to appeal his case, New
York refused to consider his appeal on the ground that the statute of limitations had
already run.
100. 372 U.S. at 423-24, 83 S. Ct. at 841 (1963).
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Habeas corpus is not simply another step in the criminal justice
system's determination of guilt or innocence. It considers instead the
"justice of the detention;" One's right of "personal liberty" is the
right to the due process of law, to be tried according to fair and
adequate procedures regardless of the question of innocence. The
mandate ofFay, and the more general expansion of the writ of habeas
corpus from Brown up until the early 1970s, is clear: "it was the
deprivation of constitutional rights that was to be avoided."' °
B. The Gateway of Innocence Standard
In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins,"°2 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to the constitutional error principle
announced in Brown v. Allen. Only when the procedural guarantees
of a fair trial are erroneously compromised will the Court grant a writ
of habeas corpus. "Federal habeas courts sit," the Court emphasized,
"to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution-not to correct errors of fact."'' 0 3 Further, the Court has
continued to hold that habeas corpus review is intended to correct and
prevent miscarriages of justice.04  But the repetition of the
constitutional error and the miscarriage of justice standards belies a
profound shift of emphasis in the Court's habeas corpus
junsprudence.' 5 Instead of viewing habeas review as a means of
preventing injustices understood as mere errors of procedure, the
Court, prodded by a number of legal commentators,l0 6 began to shift
the focus of its inquiry towards the question of verdict accuracy.'0 7
Inaccuracy, not unfairness, has been increasingly held to be the pith
of the question of injustice resulting from error.
The turning point in the construction of error in habeas corpus
jurisprudence came in 1970 when Henry J. Friendly, a respected
Court of Appeals Judge for the Second Circuit, published an article
entitled, "Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
101. Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 32, at 1046. As the Fay Court held, citing
Frankfurter's original statement of the point in Brown, "The State court cannot have
the last say when it, though on fair consideration of what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right." Fay, 372
U.S. at 422, 83 S. Ct. at 840.
102. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
103. Id. at 403, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
104. Id. at404-05, 113 S. Ct. at 862-63.
105. Steiker, supra note 80.
106. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 50; Bator, supra note 17.
107. Limin Zheng, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-
Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 Cal.. L. Rev.
2101, 2118 ff. (2002); Steiker, supra note 80; Tom Stacy, The Search for Truth in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1369 (1991).
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Judgments." ' According to Friendly, the constitutional error rule
ignores the significant interest that the criminal justice system has in
the finality of its verdicts. 09 Against the constitutional error rule's
"broad proposition that collateral attack should always be open for
the asserted denial of a 'constitutional' right," he argues for the
principle that state court convictions should be subject to habeas
challenges "only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional
plea with a colorable claim of innocence."' 0 As a general rule, a
prerequisite for the habeas corpus inquiry into the existence of
constitutional error ought to be the prisoner's capacity to show a "fair
probability" that when presented with all the evidence a reasonable
trier of fact might doubt their guilt.
The argument that a substantial doubt as to the truth of the guilty
verdict would be a necessary but not sufficient gateway through
which the habeas petitioner must pass before a Court could consider
his claim for habeas relief on constitutional error, has proven
enormously influential, especially among members of the Rehnquist
Court. Thus in Herrera v. Collins, the Court held that the claim of
innocence is "a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass
to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits.""' Although the Court has not held that a bare claim of
innocence, absent a showing of procedural error, merits relief through
a writ of habeas corpus, the plausible claim of actual innocence of the
convicted person emerged as one preliminary focus of the Court's
habeas jurisprudence. "'
In Stone v. Powell,"3 for example, the Court held that habeas
corpus proceedings could not review errors involving the introduction
of evidence that was gained by constitutionally prohibited searches
and seizures. The Stone decision cannot easily be reconciled with the
constitutional error standard. The erroneous use of illegally obtained
108. Friendly, supra note 50.
109. Friendly identified five advantages associated with the finality of criminaljudgments which are burdened by allowing prisoners to continue their legal battles
for decades after their conviction and sentencing. The most important advantage
of finality is that it would reduce the drain on the resources of the community, the
"most serious single evil" that the proliferation of habeas corpus requests imposes
on the criminal justice system. Finality would also help to restore the retributive,
deterrent, and educational aims of punishment, and to reestablish trials as the center
of the judicial inquiry into guilt. Some measure of finality, he argues, must be
sought in criminal trials. Id. at 146-49.
110. Id. at 154, 142. Judge Friendly acknowledges thatpost-conviction collateral
review by means of habeas corpus is justified irrespective of innocence in certain
extraordinary conditions.
111. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
112. Zheng, supra note 107, at 2124.
113. 428 U.S. 465, 96S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
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evidence at trial is unfair; it not only deprives the defendant of his
right to be tried according to agreed upon norms, but also treats him
unequally, in that he is denied procedural protections guaranteed to
all others. To the extent that procedural errors themselves are
miscarriages of justice remediable by habeas corpus, the mistaken
introduction of illegally obtained evidence ought to be grounds for
issuing the writ.
In refusing to characterize the mistaken introduction of illegal
evidence as a miscarriage ofjustice, the Court in Stone reasoned that
the exclusion of illegal evidence cannot be thought to protect the
innocent. That the evidence is illegally obtained does not reduce its
reliability. On the contrary, illegally obtained evidence is "typically
reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.""' 4 While not all relevant evidence is
permitted to be introduced at trial, the fact of its illegal introduction
does not qualify as a miscarriage of justice. Procedural errors such
as the iilegal introduction of evidence can only threaten to be a
miscarriage ofjustice, the Court reasons, when they increase the risk
of convicting an innocent person. The resort to habeas review for
"purposes other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an
unconstitutional loss of liberty," is consequently forbidden."' The
interest in justice that the Court in Brown and Fay found to lie in a
procedurally fair trial is, in Stone, reinterpreted as first and foremost
a substantive interest in factually accurate trials.
While the Court's decision in Stone has been severely limited,"6
the embrace of actual innocence claims as a gateway to federal
habeas corpus has survived. The primary use of the gateway
innocence standard is in cases where potential constitutional errors
would otherwise not be considered for procedural reasons relating to
the filing of the habeas claim. In cases such as Murray v. Carrier,"'
Kuhlmann v. Wilson," 8 McCleskey v. Zant, "9 and Schlup v. Delo, 20
the Court held that claims of factual innocence would trump
procedural bars that would otherwise have prevented consideration of
a defendant's constitutional error claim.' As the Court held in
Schlup, a habeas petitioner who is otherwise procedurally barred from
114. Id. at 490, 965 S. Ct. at 3050.
115. Id. at 49 n.31,965 S. Ct. at 3051 n.31..
116. See Steiker, supra note 18, at 326.
117. 477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986).
118. 477 U.S. 436, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
119. 499U.S. 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
120. 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
121. Zheng, supra note 107, at 2123-24; Joseph L. Hoffmann, Substance and
Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Courts Should Review the Merits
of Every Death Sentence, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1771, 1785-86 (2000).
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filing a writ of habeas corpus "may obtain review of his constitutional
claims only if he falls within the 'narrow class of cases... implicating
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. ' ,"122 His "claim of innocence,"
the Court argued, "does not by itself provide a basis for relief. [His]
claim is thus 'not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.'123 When
conviction of an innocent is at stake, the "ends of justice," the Court
held in Wilson, require that a claim of Constitutional error be
considered regardless of the petition's procedural problems.'24 The
"colorable claim of factual innocence,'' 12' therefore, has come to be
seen as an essential "safety valve that ensures the availability of the
writ to those who are probably innocent.' 26
The Court's shift, during the 1980s and 1990s, away from an
identification of error with a procedurally fair trial toward an equation
of error with inaccuracy appears to represent a shift in the Court's
understanding of error and its relation to justice. By miscarriage of
justice, the Court no longer signals that the absence of procedural
guarantees of fairness results in a "fundamentally defective" trial.
Instead, the Court fashions the "miscarriage of justice exception," to
serve "as 'an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man
to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' guaranteeing that the ends
ofjustice will be served in full.' 127 By miscarriage ofj ustice, the Court
clearly intends only those situations in which an innocent person is
convicted by a factually inaccurate verdict. 21
As if in answer to Judge Friendly's original query, "Is Innocence
Irrelevant?," the Court shifts the pith of the habeas corpus inquiry
from procedural demands for fairness to substantive claims of
innocence. Miscarriages of justice, the Court intones in a literal
citation of Friendly's recommendation, are only present when "the
prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable
showing of factual innocence.' 29  Whereas adherents to the
122. 513 U.S. at 314-15, 115 S. Ct. at 861 (1995) (citing McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S. Ct. 1459, 1469-70 (1991)).
123. Id. at 315, 115 S. Ct. at 861 (1995) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
404, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993)).
124. 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 (1986).
125. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2627.
126. Zheng, supra note 107, at 2124.
127. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991)
(citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-93 n..31, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 n.31
(1976)).
128. Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Saftey Valve for Innocence, 28 Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 415 (1990).
129. 477 U.S. at 454, 106 S. Ct. at 2627 (1986). See also Ledewitz, supra note
128, at 442-43.
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constitutional error doctrine argue that it is the mistaken violation of
procedures designed to guarantee a fair trial that demands habeas
corpus review in the name of justice, supporters of the gateway-
innocence doctrine contend that, except in cases that involve an
extraordinary denial of procedural protections, it is the inaccurate
conviction of innocent persons that demands habeas corpus review
for the ends ofjustice.
IV. DOES ERROR MATTER? THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT
The above-described shift in the pith of the habeas corpus
inquiry from its focus on Constitutional error to its more recent
insistence on substantive injustice as a gateway, has not been free
from politics. On the contrary, the widespread political view that
Federal justices were overusing their powers to grant habeas corpus
and interfering with the states has led the Court and conservative
members of Congress to be increasingly suspicious of habeas
claims. 30 One result of this increasing distrust of habeas corpus
petitions is that on April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).'31
The AEDPA brought with it what has been called "the most
significant habeas reforms since 1867. '32 The act, passed amidst the
groundswell of anger that followed the Oklahoma City bombing,
"dramatically altered federal habeas corpus practice," making it
much harder for convicted criminals to challenge their
convictions.'33 Many of the Act's effects further strengthened the
already emerging procedural barriers against habeas corpus. For
example, the Act instituted a one-year statute of limitations on
habeas corpus claims; 3 4 it also severely restricted the rights of
prisoners to file successive and subsequent habeas corpus petitions,
by creating a presumption of dismissal of all new claims in
successive applications, albeit with token exceptions.' 35 These and
other procedural limits were part of the AEDPA's political embrace
of the Court's effort to limit extended habeas litigation in capital
cases."'36 In effect, the AEDPA has, in conjunction with recent Court
130. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs.
"Process", 74 N.Y.U L. Rev. 313, 315 ff(1999).
131. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
132. Hoffinann, supra note 121, at 1790.
133. Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics ofFear and Death: Successive Problems
in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699, 702 (2002).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (Supp. IV. 1998).
135. Id. at (b).
136. Hoffinann, supra note 121, at 1790.
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decisions,'37 limited the Court's willingness to consider claims of error
brought before it through writs of habeas corpus.
The political and judicial interest in limiting habeas corpus as a
means to respond to legal errors raises the question of the importance
of error as a problem for the law. The Court has not yet resolved this
question for itself. As radical as the AEDPA was in its effort to limit
the availability of habeas corpus, the Act largely leaves in place the
two understandings of legal error that have come to define the Court's
habeas jurisprudence. As Larry Yackle has argued, the AEDPA
"clearly acknowledges and reinforces the federal courts' longstanding
jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions from state prisoners and to
award habeas relief to prisoners who are found to be in custody in
violation of federal law."' 38 Although there has been fear on the part
of some and hope in the hearts of others that the AEDPA would end
the use of habeas corpus as a super writ of error, the Court has
reaffirmed its basic commitment to habeas corpus. In a series of cases
since the passage of the Act, the Court has "rejected government
suggestions that the statute be interpreted to preclude habeas
petitioners from obtaining federal review of their claims."'39 Even after
the AEDPA, habeas corpus remains available as a remedy for certain
kinds of erroneous convictions.
At the heart of the AEDPA's reform of habeas corpus is section
2254(d), which has rightly been called "[t]he centerpiece of the
, ,,141[AEDPA's] habeas reforms. Section 2254(d) reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-
1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at
the State court proceeding.' 4 '
137. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 508 U.S. 968, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993)
(harmless error that does not substantially influence a jury verdict will not
invalidate final albeit erroneous verdicts).
138. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff.
L. Rev. 381, 398 (1996).
139. Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 1791.
140. Steiker, supra note 18, at 334; Yackle, supra note 138, at 382-84.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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The statute leaves untouched the basic authority of federal courts
to grant habeas relief even as it defines and limits the circumstances
in which a habeas claim will be awarded. If subsection one limits
relief to instances of legal error, subsection two suggests that a
habeas writ can be granted for factual errors as well. Section 2254
seems consistent with the Court's fundamental understanding that
both constitutional (procedural) and factual (substantive) errors are,
to some degree, remediable through habeas corpus.
In the years since the passage of the AEDPA, the attention of the
courts and most commentators has focused on subsection one of
§2254(d). This makes sense since most habeas petitions are
grounded on procedurally timely claims of constitutional error absent
a further claim of innocence or factual error. While the AEDPA has
been held to make the granting of writs of habeas corpus based on
constitutional error more difficult, it has not done away with the
interest in remedying constitutional errors. Further, there has been
little attention given to §2254(d)(2) which seems to "invite[] the
federal courts to reopen a state court's adjudication of the facts
underlying a federal claim in order to determine whether the state
court reasonably assessed the evidence.' 4 2 The question remains,
however, whether the statute does open the door to federal habeas
corpus being used as a means to consider the reasonableness of state
court's factual findings as a violation of the law itself, absent the
claim of a separate constitutional error.
In the Court's most careful consideration of section 2254(d)(1) in
Williams v. Taylor,"3 it held that "Section 2254(d)(1) defines two
categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas
relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state
court."'" Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice O'Connor held: "Under
the statute, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the
relevant state-court decision was either (1) "contrary to ... clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States," or (2) "involved in an unreasonable application of...
142. Yackle, supra note 138, at 382 & n.4. The Court's one tentative effort to
employ § 2254(d)(2) was inconclusive. See Wiggins v. Sewall, 539 U.S. 510, 123
S. Ct. 2527 (2003). This neglect may partially be a result of the fact that the
AEDPA has not been understood to challenge the Herrera and Schiup standards for
the introduction of factual evidence as an innocence gateway to the consideration
of constitutional claims of error. See Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73
n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (assuming but not deciding that the gateway innocence standard
still applies after the AEDPA); Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2002).
143. 529 U.S. 362, 1205 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) (For purposes of the interpretation
of § 2254, Justice O'Connor writes the majority opinion.).
144. Id. at 404, 120 S. Ct. at 1519 (emphasis omitted).
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clearly established Federal law. . .,14' Importantly, the court limits
the "contrary to" clause to those cases where a state court expressly
deviates from a Supreme Court opinion or "decides a case differently
than this Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."'1 46 In the
more likely situation, where a state court "identifies the correct
governing legal principle from this Court's decision but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case," O'Connor
argues that a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only when the
state court's decision is "unreasonable."' 47 What the AEDPA changes
is that a federal habeas court must now ask not merely whether the
state court's application of federal law to the facts was incorrect or
erroneous, but whether it was objectively unreasonable.1 48
Taken literally, O'Connor's distinction between incorrect and
unreasonable decisions seems to bring about a shift away from the
Court's traditional concern with using habeas corpus to overturn
convictions based on constitutional errors. While she admits that the
"term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define," O'Connor
concludes that "[flor purposes of today's opinion, the most important
point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different
from an incorrect application of federal law."' 149 Under the
"unreasonable application" clause of §2254(d)(1), therefore, a federal
judge may not issue a writ of habeas corpus based on its
"independent judgment" that the state court was in error, but must
conclude that the state court's application of the law was
unreasonable. 5 According to the Court, it is not enough for a state
court's decision to have been wrong; its mistake must also have been
made in an unreasonable way before a federal writ of habeas corpus
can be granted.
The decision in Williams seems to suggest that the Constitutional
error standard has been replaced by an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the state court decision. However, a question
remains regarding how a decision can be erroneous and yet
reasonable. This is especially true because the Court specifically
rejected a subjective inquiry into the state court's reasonableness.
The claim that a state court decided unreasonably must be a claim
that the decision was objectively unreasonable; yet how the court can
claim that a decision was objectively unreasonable without being
erroneous, or vice versa, remains an open question.
145. Id. at 404-05, 120 S. Ct. at 1519.
146. Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (2000).
147. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (2000).
148. Id. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at 1522. See Hoffmann, supra note 107, at
1791-92.
149. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S. Ct. at 1522 (2000).
150. Id. at 411, 120 S. Ct. at 1522.
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It is unclear what effect the Court's distinction between
unreasonable and incorrect judgments will have. Six of the Justices in
Williams found that the Virginia state court had been both contrary to
clearly established Federal law and involved an unreasonable
application of the Court's clearly established precedent.' 5' Similarly,
in the recent case of Wiggins v. Sewall, the Court found that the
Maryland Court offered an "objectively unreasonable" application of
its earlier decisions. 5 2 While the verdict is still out on how greatly the
Williams decision will affect habeas corpus, it is clear that the
combined force of the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses means that habeas corpus is still available as a way to overturn
decisions predicated on constitutional errors.
While the AEDPA has not eliminated habeas corpus as a means of
preventing legal errors, it has put the Court in the awkward position of
saying that certain kinds of errors are acceptable. In coming to accept
the possibility of erroneous and yet just verdicts, the decision in
Williams advances the trend in habeas corpus jurisprudence to
downplay the importance of error as a mark of injustice.
As part of its increasing acceptance of errors, the Court has
increasingly established procedural barriers to the consideration of
habeas petitions. In Wainwright v. Sykes, for example, the Court
rejected a writ of habeas corpus that argued that statements used at trial
had been acquired unconstitutionally. 1' Because the defendant did not
object to the testimony at trial, the Court held that he had procedurally
defaulted his constitutional claim.'4 Similarly, in Teague v. Lane, the
Court announced that once a defendant is found guilty and has
exhausted his appeals, he cannot benefit from a later interpretation of
a law or constitutional provision that would have offered him a
defense. '55
In these and other cases'56 the trend in habeas corpus
jurisprudence is to downplay the importance of error as a mark of
injustice. Even as legal error is admitted to be a problem that is
remediable through habeas proceedings, the Court has increasingly
concluded that the problem posed by error is insubstantial enough
151. Id. at 397-98, 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1515, 1523 (2000).
152. 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
153. 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
154. Id. at 87, 97 S. Ct. at 2506.
155. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). See generally Linda Meyer,
"Nothing We Say Matters ". Teague and NewRules, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1994).
156. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982); Kuhlnann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991);
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). For a survey of the
Court's use of "excessive proceduralism" to limit habeas corpus relief, see Steiker,
supra note 18; Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 1771.
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concluded that the problem posed by error is insubstantial enough
that errors can, in many cases, be ignored. Although non-harmless
errors may and do result in erroneous convictions, these errors will
not invalidate a judicial verdict as long as they are reasonable errors.
Paradoxically, even as the concern with error has blossomed
throughout the 2 0 th and 21 s centuries, there has emerged a seemingly
opposing trend that seeks to render error harmless in the furtherance
of a hard-nosed law-and-order politics.
The above discussion shows that the judicial debate over the
characterization of error in habeas corpus proceedings appears to split
into two fundamentally opposing positions. On the one hand, error
is understood by some as a matter of unfairness. Error, in other
words, is conceived as procedural error, the misinterpretation or
denial of procedural safeguards designed to ensure the equal and fair
treatment of all persons. These constitutionally guaranteed
procedures of due process fix the risk of inaccurate convictions at an
acceptably stringent level and are, therefore, the bedrock of a just
legal system. To the extent that justice is identified with the fair and
equal treatment of persons, the violation of these procedures is in
itself thought to be a substantive moral injustice. Error is, on the
other hand, understood to be substantive inaccuracy. When one is
erroneously convicted and punished for a crime one did not commit,
the verdict is considered unjust.
Both types of errors, unfairness and inaccuracy, are understood
within the habeas corpus discourse as examples of injustice. And yet,
the AEDPA is just one example of the trends in the Court's habeas
jurisprudence to repress the concern with the injustices associated
with legal error. Indeed, as Judge Harry T. Edwards has recently
argued, there is an ever-increasing trend for the Court to render "an
error harmless so long as the appellate court remains convinced of the
defendant's guilt."' 57 Without denying that law-and-order politics
can explain some of the pressure on the Court to accept erroneous
verdicts, the question remains: how is it that error is at once
associated with injustice and, at the same time, increasingly
overlooked?
To explain this apparent paradox requires an exploration into the
modern conception ofjustice that animates law. The claim that error
is understood as injustice merely raises the question: What isjustice?
Since justice, as it was understood in pre-modem law, excludes the
consideration of error, the modern belief in a close relation between
157. Harry T. Edwards, Madison Lecture: To Err is Human, But Not Always
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167, 1187
(1995).
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justice and error suggests a shift in the understanding of justice.
Justice retains its connection to truth, but this modem connection
reveals a specific understanding of truth.
V. ERROR AND TRUTH: THE VICTORY OF LEGITIMACY OVER
TRUTH
The debate between unfairness and inaccuracy as two types of
error appears to reflect a profound difference in the way injustice is
understood. This appearance of difference, however, masks an
equally if not more important sameness. Unfairness and inaccuracy,
the two opposing understandings of error and injustice in the habeas
corpus legal debates, are actually two ways to speak about the
absence of objectivity in criminal convictions. The debate over error
and justice, therefore, presents itself as a debate over how best to
secure the objective truth of legal judgments.
For those who argue that justice is accuracy, objectivity means
the conformity of verdict result with some actual event. Jurists who
argue thatjustice is fairness are also speaking about objectivity, albeit
objectivity understood to mean the guarantee of neutral and unbiased
procedures. The debate over how to construct error in habeas corpus
proceedings, therefore, reveals itself to be an internal debate between
two competing ways of securing just legal verdicts through objective
certainty. The goal of both sides of the debate is the objectivity of
legal judgments.
The identification ofjust verdicts with objective truth represents
a shift from the pre-modem understanding of truth and justice, and
the way that they are manifested through legal verdicts. Pre-modem
criminal verdicts strove after truth in the sense of right, i.e. as the
saying of the truth of the matter. Modem criminal law seeks instead
to guarantee to the objectivity of verdicts. But objectivity is not the
same as truth. Whereas truth is immeasurable-that before which we
stand awestruck in silence'5 8-objectivity demands criteria of
measurement, either by a correspondence with facts that are out there,
or by a set of rules that ground the quality of our beliefs.'59 The
158. The awe-inspiring power of law is best expressed in Kant's feeling of
reason, the finding of rationality and thus of autonomy (auto-nomos) that sets one
before the truth of law and renders one awestruck (Die Achtung vor dem Gesetz).
Immanuel Kant, Grudlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1965). The "Achtung"or
"awe" that I feel before the greatness of the law, is, in Heidegger's language, the
call of silence ("Die Gelaut der Stille") in the face of the Ereignis, the "es gibt" of
law. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache 30 (1959). See generally Nonet,
supra note 66, at 996-1002.
159. Karl Popper provides a clear taxonomy of the difference between
objectivity as correspondence and objectivity as grounds for belief, though he
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Court's rhetorical positioning of error as a failure of legal objectivity
suggests that contemporary jurisprudence, at least within the debates
over habeas corpus, speaks about legal error without speaking about
truth. 1
60
Rather than justice and truth, the habeas corpus debates over
legal error display a concern for the legitimacy of verdicts.
Legitimacy is not justice, but rather the belief in the authority of the
legal system.' 6' As Drucilla Cornell has argued, "the idea of
legitimacy as understood within any given legal system ... cannot be
identified as justice.'' 162  This is not to say, as some have, that
authority is never legitimate. 63 Nor is it to say that all claims to
legitimacy are suspect. Rather, it is to recognize that the law seeks
the authority of legitimacy at the same time as law ceases to make
a claim to truth and justice as absolute ideals. The embrace of
legitimacy as a ground for law arises only once law's natural,
traditional, and insightful authority comes to be questioned. The
fact that the granting of habeas corpus has come to be determined by
the desire for legitimacy reveals that truth and justice, as legal
ideals, have been supplanted by the belief in the legitimacy of
authority. The Court, by treating justice as objectivity, drops truth
as well as justice out of the picture.' 64 The rise of legitimacy
guaranteed by objective verdicts follows, therefore, the loss of truth
and justice as meaningful legal ideals.
Within the habeas corpus jurisprudence, the move from finding
justice in the truth of a verdict to locating justice in the legitimacy
of belief is illustrated in the case of Herrera v. Collins.6 Leonel
Torres Herrera was convicted of a double murder by a Texas jury in
1982, and sentenced to the death penalty. After a series of
unsuccessful appeals, Herrera filed a federal writ of habeas corpus
charging constitutional error regarding the identifications offered
against him at trial. His habeas petition was also denied, and the
Supreme Court refused to hear his claim in 1990. In 1992, Herrera
filed a second habeas corpus petition, this time alleging no
assigns the former access to absolute truth. Even, Popper, however, realizes that
truth, which cannot be recognized by any general criteria, is something to be
searched for. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge 224-28 (1992). For a discussion of the relation between truth and
objectivity, see Constable, supra note 56.
160. Constable, supra note 57, at 43.
161. For a discussion of the difference between belief and truth, see Barbara
Herrenstein Smith, Belief and Resistance: A SymmetricalAccount, in Questions of
Evidence (1994).
162. Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit 118 (1992).
163. See, e.g., Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (1976).
164. See, e.g., Constable, supra note 57.
165. 506 United States 390, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
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constitutional errors, but claiming instead that new evidence had
surfaced proving his innocence. Mindful of the Court's shifting
focus towards the recognition of inaccuracy as the core of habeas
corpus doctrine, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause forbids the execution of an innocent citizen.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Herrera's appeal, and to
decide the question of whether a claim of actual innocence, absent
an independent constitutional violation, is grounds for habeas relief.
In Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, the Court avoids
ruling on this issue; it does so by arguing that Herrera is
undoubtedly guilty.'66 In support of its claim of Herrera's guilt, the
Court offers two arguments. First Rehnquist rehearses in depth the
overwhelming evidence of Herrera's guilt.'67 Herrera's proffer of
new evidence is considered and refuted as well.'68 These substantive
and factual claims of guilt, however, are importantly marginal to the
Court's decision. 16
9
The Court concedes the proposition that the Constitution of the
United States forbids the execution of a person who is innocent of
the crime for which he was convicted, has, "elemental appeal.'
170
Against this feeling, the Court opposes the rationality of a "system
of criminal justice," in which "'innocence' or 'guilt' must be
determined in some sort of a judicial proceeding.".... The second
and controlling argument that the Court offers for denying Herrera's
habeas corpus claim, therefore, is the purely procedural ground that
he had already been adjudged guilty in a proper trial. 172
Since the Court accepts Herrera's guilt as already decided, it
never reaches the merits of his claim that his conviction was
substantively in error. The Court's explicit endorsement of the rule
that "evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground
for relief on federal habeas corpus," is surely mitigated, even
enabled, by the marginal yet omnipresent evidence of his guilt.
Herrera's guilt, however, is precisely what the Court was asked to
reconsider. Absent the assuredness of Herrera's guilt, the Court
would have been forced to answer the embarrassing question it
bends over backwards to avoid, 173 namely whether it is unjust to
166. Id. at 398-99, 421, 113 S. Ct. at 859-60.
167. Id. at 393-97, 113 S. Ct. at 856-57.
168. Id. at 417-18, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
169. The claim of Herrera's substantive guilt is, however, the central holding of
O'Connor's concurrence. See id. at 419, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
170. Id. at 398, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
171. Herrera, 506 United States at 398, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
172. Id. at 399, 113 S. Ct. at 859-60.
173. The court found the question of whether habeas corpus could be used to
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execute an innocent man who has been convicted by fair and just
procedures.
The Court's hesitancy to use habeas corpus to protect an innocent
man is somewhat surprising, especially considering its increasing
endorsement of the principle that "the central purpose of any system
of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent."'"
As the Court rightly contends, the recent trend in habeas corpusjurisprudence, as described in Section II above, has hardly been
blind to the question of innocence. Nevertheless, the Court stops
short of finding the execution of an innocent a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Instead, "[t]he fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception is available 'only where the prisoner supplements
his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of* factual
innocence.""" Claims of purely substantive errors regarding
innocence and guilt are, absent an additional assertion of procedural
error, not cognizable as miscarriages ofjustice.
A clue as to why the Court finds itself compelled to proclaim and
then reject the elemental appeal of the principle against executing
erroneously convicted persons is its continued use of scare quotes
whenever it speaks about innocence and guilt. Rehnquist repeatedly
speaks of "'innocence' or 'guilt"'" 76 and "'actual innocence,""7 7 in
quotation marks, as if guilt and innocence were spectres from another
world. Innocence and guilt, in Rehnquist's opinion, are rejected, or
at least abandoned, as actual concepts. Knowledge of innocence, like
knowledge of truth, is beyond the ken of human capacity; all that is
left, therefore, is the belief in the capacity of legal procedures to
discover the truth and to do justice.
Innocence and guilt, Rehnquist argues, "must be determined in
some sort of a judicial proceeding;" they have no meaning outside
their legal determinations.' The Court need not inquire into
Herrera's innocence, therefore, because he comes before the Court
prevent the execution of a person who made a strong claim of innocence "a
sensitive and, to say the least, troubling one." Id.. at 421, 113 S. Ct. at 871
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority opinion and the concurrence by Justice
White assume, "for the sake of argument in deciding this case," that if a truly
persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" were made, federal habeas corpus
relief might be available. Id. at 418, 113 S. Ct. at 870. Three dissenting justices
expressed their belief that executing an innocent man was a violation of the
Constitution. The remaining Justices refused to state an opinion on the matter.
174. Id. at 398, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
175. Id. at 404, 113 S. Ct. at 862 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 United States at 453,
106 S. Ct. at 2627).
176. Herrera, 506 United States at 398, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
177. Id. at 395, 404, 408, 113 S. Ct. at 858, 862, 864.
178. Id. at 398, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
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"as one who has been convicted by due process of law."' 79 Since the
belief in truth and guilt can only be reliably secured by dependence
upon procedurally fair trials, a post-conviction challenge on the basis
of innocence commits the justice system to an inquiry that all but
paralyzes the capacity for final judgments. 0
Justice Blackmun's dissent decries as "fatuous" Rehnquist's
absolute reliance on the trial verdict's judgment as a determination
of guilt.' 8 ' According to Blackmun, Herrera's claim that he had new
evidence proving his innocence demands a factual determination of
his guilt on the basis of the notion of substantive due process;
substantive due process "prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that 'shocks the conscience.' "182 Since Herrera seeks an
objective (i.e. accurate) determination of his innocence, Rehnquist's
appeal to the objective (i.e. fair) procedures of his trial ignores the
substance of his claim.
The dispute between Rehnquist and Blackmun quickly
degenerates into a judicial spat. Rehnquist charges Blackmun with
putting "the cart before the horse" for his willingness to entertain
Herrera's claim of innocence. Since Herrera is alreadyproven guilty,
the question is not the substantive inquiry into whether the
Constitution permits the execution of an innocent man, but rather the
procedural question of whether the determination of Herrera's guilt
was fair. Not to be outdone, Blackmun responds that the majority's
acceptance of the procedural determination of guilt as having priority
over the substantive question of actual guilt, "to borrow a phrase, this
'puts the cart before the horse. '18' 3 He argues that to accept the trial
outcome as more certain than a substantive inquiry into actual
innocence is an affront against basic principles of substantive
justice.'"
Concealed beneath the Court's bickering is the debate between
the objectivity of unfairness and the objectivity of inaccuracy.
Simply put, Blackmun and Rehnquist disagree about which kind of
objectivity is more objective - and thus more legitimate. Neither
claims the possibility of actual objectivity, i.e. of perfect certainty.
Blackmun, for example, argues that it shocks the conscience to put
an innocent person to death without arguing that Herrera is in fact
innocent. Legitimacy, he suggests, requires an objective as possible
determination of the defendant's actual guilt.
179. Id. at 407 n.6, 113 S. Ct. at 864 n.6.
180. Id. at 399, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
181. Id. at 435 n.5, 113 S. Ct. at 878 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Herrera, 506 United States at 435 n.5; 113 S. Ct. at 853 n.5.
183. Id., 113 S. Ct. at 878 n.5.
184. It is, in Blackmun's words, "contrary to contemporary standards of
decency." Id. at 430, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Rehnquist also denies the possibility of absolutely objective
procedures, even as he insists on the objectivity of criminal trials.
The legitimacy of criminal convictions demands respect for the
criminal jury trial as the adequate time and space for the
determination of guilt.'85 It is the trial, with the constitutionally
guaranteed protections of due process of law, that must remain the
source of the legitimacy of criminal verdicts. Objective procedures
that guarantee determinations of guilt remain the goal of the legal
process not because they promise certainty, but rather because they
assure continued belief in the system's legitimacy.
At the core of the debate in Herrera is the problem not ofjustice
but of legitimacy. The demand for legitimacy is grounded on the
overriding demand, heard both from legal and non-legal comers, for
objectivity and fairness. Fairness has become identified with
justice.'86 Playing fair is playing by the rules. As a rulebound
measure, fairness is grounded in the identification of justice with
objectively true verdicts. To the extent possible, verdicts should be
objectively accurate. However, since absolute certainty is impossible,
fairness settles for the probablistic legitimacy of procedurally fair
trials. In either case, fairness stands against the idea of justice
beyond the rules.
The demand for the legitimacy of objective verdicts is grounded
on the overriding demand, heard both from legal and non-legal
comers, for fairness. Contra Rawls, however, fairness is not the same
as justice. As Marianne Constable has argued, fairness "(like
objectivity, which is not quite truth) is not quite justice."'87 Fairness,
as can be heard in the expressions, a "fair answer," or "a fair effort,"
names the mean, a middling and inoffensive leveling. The core
thought of fairness, and the reason that it has become the central
concern of modem criminal law, is equality.' As opposed to the
striving after justice in the particular case as it is demanded by the
ancient principle: Suum cuique tribuere (to give to each his own),
the modem doctrine of fairness counsels: treat people as equals even
when they are different. Because fairness treats people like objective
science treats facts, equally and according to neutral principles, it
cannot do justice to the individual differences that inevitably exist.
What the effort to eradicate unfairness from legal verdicts seeks to
accomplish, therefore, is neither a just nor a true criminal justice
system, but rather a legitimate legal system.
185. Id. at 401, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
186. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
187. Constable, supra note 57.
188. For an account of modem law that centers on the principles of equality and
fairness, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
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VI. CONCLUSION: ERROR, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
Habeas corpus became the vehicle in which late twentieth century
American law dedicated itself to the avoidance of legal error. It is
strange, therefore, that after thirty years of considering the merits of
petitioners' claims of legal error, the Court in Herrera and the
Congress with the AEDPA have sought to hide errors behind a veil
of procedural rules. The initial strangeness becomes more unsettling
when one considers that the refusal to reach the merits of error claims
under habeas corpus has become almost standard in the Court's
habeas jurisprudence.'89 Although the Court continues to describe
habeas corpus as a remedy for legal errors, its willingness to address
the merits of error-claims has retreated behind a veil of procedural
rules. 9 0
While admitting that error remains a problem for the law, the
Court's increasing understanding of error as threatening the
legitimacy rather than the justice of verdicts helps explain why error
need not be taken seriously. Instead of an example of injustice, error
becomes a disturbance, a reminder of the tenuous legitimacy of
positive law. As a symptom of the Court's ever tenuous legitimacy,
error is more easily ignored than remedied. In the Court's recent
habeas corpus jurisprudence, therefore, error disappears not, as in
pre-modem legal systems, because verdicts are true; on the contrary,
claims of error disappear precisely because the truth of verdicts is
considered to be irrelevant to their legitimacy.
But this unwillingness to consider the merits of error claims does
not at all signal a return to the values and presuppositions of pre-
modem justice. On the contrary, the gesture of considering claims of
error and the simultaneous avoidance of addressing these claims
heralds a uniquely modem system of law. The authority and thus the
legitimacy of law comes to inhere in neither a (foreclosed)
understanding of the truth of the matter, nor in the (unattainable)
objectivity of judgments, but rather in the presumed or cultivated
authority of the judge.'9' When justice and truth are secured only
through the legitimate authority of the judicial utterance, law, as
189. See Teague v. Lane, 489 United States 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). See
especially Linda Meyer's discussion of Teague and its progeny demonstrating
Teague's reliance on a positive law model. Meyer, supra note 155.
190. In addition to the procedural ducking of the error claim in Herrera, the
Court has used the procedural rule against retroactive decisions and the "new rules"
rule of Teague to avoid consideration of the merits ofhabeas corpus claims. Meyer,
supra note 155, at 455-59.
191. For a discussion of the possibility ofjudicial authority within positive law,
see Roger Berkowitz, The Judge as Captain, in Europaische und Amerikanische
Richterbilder (1996).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. rightly perceived, becomes what
judges say it is.'92
To say that law is whatever judges say it is is to say that law is
positive law. To speak about positive law is to invite confusion.
Positive law is typically used in at least three different senses. On the
one hand, positive law is simply the approximate spoken or written
expression of the natural law.1 3 In this sense of positive law, the
posited law, what is, is determined, or at least guided by,' 94 the ought
of natural law. A second sense of positive law has more modem
roots. In this sense, posited law, the is, is separated from the moral
world of natural law and governed purely by the willful commands
of sovereign authorities.' Related to this separation of the is from
the ought is a third sense of positive law in which the is itself is
transformed into the ought.9 - The entire realm of natural law, of
transcendence and of truth, is shattered, and the claims of what is
become claims of right. 97
The second and third sense of positive law both are characterized
by the collapse of the moral into the posited world. What determines
positive law in these two senses, as Niklas Luhmann has perceptively
described, is a decision.1'9 By decision is not meant the historical
fact of a decision, i.e., the act of a judge positing the law. Not only
modem positivist judges, but also Roman law praetors and early
English jurors make decisions regarding the law. Rather, what is
characteristic of a positive law decision is the fact that the law it
announces only becomes valid by the power of this decision.' 99
Within a world of positive law, law becomes, in its nature, a decision,
changeable, and subject to the willfulness of the legislator. The
changeability of law is legalized and its existence is, by necessity,
always contingent and alterable.2 °"
What is "won" by such a flexible, changeable, and provisional
concept of law is, of course, an increase in the usefulness of law.
192. O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law (1996).
193. Such a view can be attributed to Thomas Aquinas.
194. For example, by a Kantian idea of a regulative principle.
195. Martin Luther's theory of the two realms is one of the earliest expressions
of the separation of the is and the ought characteristic of the modem idea of positive
law. See also John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1995).
196. A leading proponent of the sociology of law in this sense is Niklas
Luhmann. See, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie (1987).
197. What is described here is the reign of the sociology as it is expressed by
Friedrich Nietzsche in the fifth stage of his history of the world as an error.
Nietzsche, Gotzen-Dammerung 31 (1985).
198. Luhmann, supra note 196, at 207 ff. All translations of German texts are
my own.
199. Id. at 208-09.
200. Id. at 210.
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Since law is always decided anew, law today can conform to specific
social needs that yesterday were not apparent; law becomes "more
and more an instrument of planned changes of reality in a fullness of
particularities.""'' Law itself, as Luhmann recognizes, undergoes a
"radical inner inversion" and sacrifices the characteristic "of being
anchored in a true world order with invariable natural and moral
groundings of law."2 Law loses its temporality, its materiality, and
its force; it disappears into a sea of social dimensions, and becomes
a tool of societal ends as opposed to the expression of a foundational
saying of the truth of a people. 3 Positive law is a technical law that
is created by man in the interests of social ends.
Positive law is therefore trivial law." 4 As Friedrich Carl von
Savigny observed, "What comes before us as made by human hands
will always be distinguished in the feeling of the people from that
whose origin is not so visible and graspable."'205 Law in the modem
age loses its weight, what Friedrich Nietzsche calls the
Schwergewicht .6 by which it stamps its presence, its importance, and
its holiness, and by which it demands obedience. In such a world,
statements of law cease to matter almost as soon as they are handed
down.
20 7
Against the ever-growing dominance of positive law, I have tried
to suggest that the writ of habeas corpus offers one way for the law
to hold onto an ideal of justice beyond the legitimacy of written rules
and spoken decisions. Since habeas corpus straddles justice and
legitimacy as two opposing ideas ofjustice and law, it can and ought
to serve as an escape hatch through which justices can flee when the
otherwise legitimate application of the laws threatens to lead not
merely to error, but also to injustice. What makes habeas corpus the
great and efficacious writ is its power as a writ of unfettered justice.
To the extent that habeas corpus is an extraordinary legal writ for the
doing of justice, habeas corpus has important and largely unnoted
parallels with the pardon. Habeas corpus is, at least potentially, a
legal procedure that aims to accomplish what the pardon conceives
as a "lawful alegality."20 Given my argument that habeas corpus
201. Id. at211.
202. Id. at 212.
203. Id. at 216.
204. Luhmann, supra note 196, at 255.
205. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vom Berufunsrer Zeit ffir Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft 43 (1973): "Was so vor unsern Augen von Menschenhanden
geschaffen ist, wird im Gefiihl des Volkes stets von demjenigen unterschieden
werden, dessen Entstehung nicht eben so sichtbar und greifbar ist. "
206. 5 Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bise, in Kritische Studien Ausgabe,
341 (Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari eds., 1988).
207. Meyer, supra note 155, at 424.
208. Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan,
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jurisprudence has continually retreated from imagining habeas corpus
as an extraordinary legal means for the doing ofjustice beyond the
laws, it should not be surprising that the use of pardons has suffered
a radical decline during the twentieth century.2" For both the
executive pardon and the judicial writ of habeas corpus, the
conflation of injustice with error has made the appeal to an ideal of
justice beyond legitimacy difficult if not impossible. However, I
suggest that habeas corpus, at its best, offers a vision of law that
refuses to expel the ideals of justice, mercy, and grace from an
increasingly positivist understanding of the law as a set of valid and
authoriative rules.
Sacco and Vanzetti were executed 75 years ago because Justice
Holmes insisted that habeas corpus could not be used to prevent an
unjust yet legally valid verdict. Just nine years ago, Leonel Herrera
was executed because the Supreme Court insisted that habeas corpus
did not permit inquiry into new evidence of a convicted man's
innocence unless that evidence was also accompanied by claims of
constitutionally invalid procedural errors. Although habeas corpus
had evolved in the intervening years into the equivalent of a super
writ of error, the inquiry it sanctions brings law no closer to the
imperative of justice. Instead, the error-centricity of habeas
jurisprudence maintains Holmes' original focus on the rule of law as
a law of rules.
Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric ofSparing Life (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
209. Id.
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